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I. Introduction 
 
Benefits from schooling are uncertain. Going to school may either increase or decrease 
earnings risk. Realised earnings variances for individuals with given levels of schooling are 
well documented, but such data are not informative on risk as they also include unobserved 
heterogeneity that may govern potential students’ choice
2. Empirical information on the 
extent of risk in schooling choice is very important. With uncertain schooling benefits a fact 
of life, we need to know the extent of risk as an input for realistically modeling schooling 
choice as a choice under risk (Levhari and Weiss, 1974). Knowing the extent of risk is 
particularly relevant for policy issues. Education is often promoted as an insurance against the 
vagaries of the labour market (or even life) but the argument only holds if indeed continued 
education reduces risk; we have no solid evidence that it does. 
  A recent paper by Chen (2008) recognizes the potential bias in ex post earnings data 
and suggests a method to correct for it. She claims two major contributions. The first is the 
identification of the causal relation between education and inequality. The second is the 
decomposition of wage inequality between uncertainty and unobserved heterogeneity
3. We 
considered Chen’s method a sufficiently promising approach to learn about the relationship 
between schooling and risk and we decided to apply it to data from different countries, in 
search of reliable and robust empirical information.  
  As a natural check on reliability of Chen’s result and on correct application of her 
method, we will replicate her estimation on the original population. Economists often praise 
the virtue of replication, but rarely attempt it. We strongly believe that putting empirical 
results under careful scrutiny is an important if not essential task per se. Hamermesh (2007) 
defines pure replication as examining the same question and model using the underlying 
original data set and scientific replication as the same type of research on different sample and 
different population. The present work covers both aspects. Our results underscore the value 
of both types of replication. 
  Chen reports two main conclusions. First, risk does not increase with educational level 
as previous research on the topic suggested. Second, she finds evidence of pervasive 
underestimation of potential wage differences by observed wages inequalities. Our 
estimations on the same sample and population do not confirm these findings. On one hand, 
                                                 
2 Realised earnings variance has no robust relationship with length of education: depending on time and country, 
it may increase, decrease or stay constant. See Hartog, Van Ophem and Bajdechi (2004) and Raita (2005).  
3 A different method to reach the same goal has been proposed by Cunha, Heckman and Navarro (2005). Also 
Belzil and Leonardi (2007) take endogeneity into account to establish how risk aversion is affecting educational 
choices.   3
we find that risk does increase, for every level after high school. On the other hand, we obtain 
a theoretically unexpected underestimation of potential inequality by observed inequality. We 
cannot locate the exact cause for these deviations, as exact replication was prohibited by US 
data disclosure regulation and by obscurities in Chen’s report
4.  
  British data do not confirm our results and are neither in conformity with Chen’s 
original results. In fact, risk decreases by schooling level while for only three out of six 
educational categories we encounter the expected positive ratio of potential/observed wage 
variability. With German data, we find correlations coefficients outside the permitted interval: 
the model simply does not apply to these data. We must conclude that the relationship 
between level of schooling and risk is far from settled.   
  We proceed as follows. In section II we set forth Chen’s model, in Section III we 
discuss the data and in Section IV we present the replication results. In Section V we apply 
the model to American women, in Section VI to men in the UK and in Section VII to men in 
Germany. Section VIII concludes.   
 
II. Chen’s model 
 
A. The theoretical model  
The model in Chen (2008) has been constructed to exploit the data in the NLSY79. 
Consider a panel dataset of N workers observed over T time periods indexed by subscripts i 
and t respectively. In the first period worker i’s schooling level is determined; it will not 
change over the following periods. The schooling level chosen by the individual will be 
indicated with s. The possible choices in the NLSY79 are four: no high school diploma ( i s =0), 
high school graduate ( i s =1), some college ( i s =2) and four years college or beyond ( i s =3). 
it y indicates the observed log wage in period t for person i. The worker’s potential wage is 
obviously observed only in one educational level, therefore, the worker’s observed wage is: 
 
0123 {0 } {1 } {2 } {3 } it it i it i it i it i y y Is y Is y Is y Is     ,                   (1)    
 
                                                 
4 All our doubts and queries raised in the replication have been submitted to Chen. Unfortunately, we have not 
received any clarification for any of the unclear passages, not even after the editors of REStat supported our 
requests.        4
where I{ } is the indicator function taking value 1 if the subject belongs to that specific 
schooling category and 0 otherwise. The link between schooling level  i s and potential wage 
( sit y ) is given by the following regression model: 
 
sit s it s s si st it yx e         if  i s =s.                                         (2) 
 
s  is the intercept for schooling level s,  s  the vector of coefficients of the observable 
characteristics  it x ,  si e  and  it  are unit root random variables uncorrelated with each other. 
The time invariant individual fixed effects are incorporated in ss i e  . This term measures the 
unobserved earning potential at schooling level s  which is allowed to be correlated with 
observable characteristics it x .  st it    denotes the transitory shock, assumed to be uncorrelated 
with observables. The potential wage variation is 
22
ss t     for subjects’ schooling choices s 
and covariates at time t. The permanent component 
2
s  is created by variations in the 
individual specific effects which are supposed to vary across educations, but to be constant in 
time. The temporary shocks emerging from macroeconomic conditions or institutional 
changes are incorporated in 
2
st  which can vary with both time and schooling level. The 
variables of interest in this model are the variances of both components in potential wages. 
The selection problem is formalized in a latent-index schooling assignment rule: 
 
i ss   if  is A   for s=0,1,2 or 3,                                               (3)   
 
where the unobserved schooling factor  i  summarizes the private information such as taste for 
education, ability and so on, which influences the subjects’ educational choices. 
1, {: } si s i i s i Aaa        is the group of individuals who chose educational level s. 
si s i az     is the minimal level of the unobserved schooling factor in  s A . The vector 
i z contains both covariates  it x and an instrument for education whose coefficients are 
contained in .  0    and  4  . The structure of error terms is known to all agents and 
summarized by: 
   5
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    
    
    
         
.                                                    (4) 
 
As assumed, the unobserved schooling factor is correlated with the individual fixed 
effects, but not with the transitory shocks  st  . The correlation coefficient ( s  ) can assume 
either positive or negative values. In case of positive value we have positive selection, the 
opposite in case of negative values.  
The parameter  i  clarifies why it is important to distinguish between wage variability 
and risk. In fact, the private information, by definition unobservable to the econometrician, 
can be used to predict the distribution of potential wages accessible to the subject for each 
schooling level. The expected value of potential wage at time t and schooling level s, from a 
personal point of view is given by: 
 
          [| , , ] sit i it i s it s s i Ey s sx x  ,                                       (5) 
 
where  si     represents the unobserved heterogeneity component at schooling level s 
and ss s    . Equation (5) follows from the distributional assumptions in (4) and   
[| ,,] si i it i s i Ee s sx    .  
Since the agent knows his own ability and tastes and uses the information to select the 
appropriate level of schooling, the degree of wage uncertainty can not exceed the degree of 
potential wage inequality. The wage uncertainty at schooling level s is measured by
5: 
 
22 2 2 2 2 [| , , ] ( 1 ) . s s si st it i it i s s st s st Var e s s x                              (6) 
 
The second equality follows from the distributional assumptions described in (4): 
2 (| ,,)1 . si i it i s Var e s s x     This equation makes explicit that potential wage variability 
(
22
ss t    ) is formed by two components: inequality created by wage uncertainty  st   and 
inequality from unobserved heterogeneity
22 2
ss s    . In fact, if we rewrite equation (6) we 
obtain: 
22 2 2 2
ss ts s s        and remembering ss s     we see that
222 2
ss t s s      . 
                                                 
5 We copy this equation from Chen; it is clear that  should be subscripted for time, but Chen ignores this. See 
also section 3C.   6
This equation also shows the three sources of uncertainty that each individual has to 
face: the earnings potential  s  of the individual fixed effect ( si e ); correlation between 
potential wages and private information ( s  ); transitory shocks due to institutional changes 
( st  ). 
Equations (4) and (5) imply that potential wages are composed of observed 
heterogeneity ( it s x  ), unobserved heterogeneity ( si   ) and an unforeseeable component ( st  ) 
plus an error term ( it u ) 
 
, sit s it s s i st it y xu                                                      (7) 
 
where  it u   is a normalized random variable, uncorrelated with observable and 
unobservable characteristics.  st it u  is called the unforeseeable component of wage residuals, 
that is to say risk. The first three terms of equation (7) are a direct consequence of the value of 
potential wage expected (by the individual) as explained in equation (5). The last term is 
describing uncertainty as modeled in equation (6) corrected by a normally distributed error 
term.  
From this discussion it should be clear that the targets of identification are: wage 
uncertainty ( st  ) and the permanent and transitory component of potential wage inequality 
(
2
s   and 
2
st  ).  
 
B. Model estimation and parameter identification   
 Equations (5) and (6) can not be used for regression analysis since  i   is unobserved; what is 
observed is the educational choice of an agent. The mean and variance of observed wages are 
derived by the following equations: 
 
, [| ;, ] [ | ;, ] i t i i ti s i t i si ti s i t s s s s i Ey s sx z Ey A x z x                       (8) 
 
22 2 2 2 [| ;, ] [ | ;, ] ( 1 ) i t i i ti s s i s t i t i si ti s s s i s t s s t Var y s s x z Var e A x z                   (9) 
 
These equations specify the requirement for the construction of adjustments for truncation 
( ) and selection ( ), explained below. Equation (8) shows that observed wages overstate or   7
understate the mean potential wages depending on the sign of the correlation term s  . The 
selectivity adjustment  si   is an inverse Mill’s ratio: 
 
           1, 1, [ | ] [ ( ) ( )/ ( ) ( )]. si i i s si s i s i si EA a aaa                  (10) 
 
Equation (9) shows how regardless of the sign of selection bias, the observed wages 
understate the degree of potential wage inequality for each educational level. The degree of 
understatement is called by Chen truncation adjustment ( si  ): 
 
              
2
1, 1, 1, 1 [ | ] [ ( ) ( )]/[ ( ) ( )], s i i i s s i s is i s is i s i s i Var A a a a a a a  (11) 
 
where   and denote standard normal density and distribution function, respectively. 
   The inclusion of inverse Mill’s ratio is not enough if the target of identification is the 
untruncated variance of wages. For this purpose, a multi-step process is proposed. The first 
step is to obtain the truncation and selectivity adjustment in the first stage of a Heckman 
selection model. Then, a fixed-effect model based on equation (8) is estimated and the 
transitory component 
2
st   identified
6. The fixed effect model is expressed as: 
 
() () ( ) it i it i s sit si yy xx       if  i s =s,                                   (12) 
 
where i y ,  i x and  si   denote the averages over time of the corresponding variables over the 
survey years.  
Next, a between-individuals model identifies the schooling coefficient: 
 
  is i s s s ii y xw                                                        (13) 
 
The error term  is s i s i s s i wu      satisfies by construction 
[| ;,]0 ii i i Ew s sx z  and
22 2 2 [| ;,] / i i i i s s si st i t Var w s s x z T        . Thus, the 
consistent estimator for the permanent component of potential wage inequality is:  
 
                                                 
6 The complete process leading to the identification of the transitory component is discussed in Chen (2008) note 
9 p. 278.   8
22 2 ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ (| ; , ) / si i i i s s t
t
Var w s s x z T                                           (14) 
 
The first term of this summation is the mean squared errors of the between-individuals 
model, whose estimates will be presented in table 4a in section III; the second is the 
interaction between the consistent estimate of the unobserved heterogeneity term ( ) and the 
sample average of the truncation adjustment ( ˆ  ); the third the ratio between the transitory 
component of wage inequality (
2 ˆst  ) and
11 (/ ) i i TT N
    .   
Let’s recollect the concepts that have been introduced so far:   
  Observed wages (| ; , it i it i y ss x z  ): wages observed in the data.  
  Potential wages ( sit y ): wages obtained by individual i if he had chosen schooling 
level s. Potential wage is the sum of observed heterogeneity ( it s x    - known to 
individuals and econometrician); unobserved heterogeneity ( si    - known only to 
the individuals); unforeseeable component ( st  it u  - unknown to everyone). 
  Observed wage inequality ( [| ;, ] it i it i Var y s s x z  ): within educational category 
variation in wages. It is decomposed as the sum of transitory volatility (
2
st   - 
estimates shown in panel B and B’ of table 4a below) and the mean squared errors 
of the between individual-model (estimates shown in Panel A of table 4a below).  
  Potential wage inequality (
2
s   +
2
st  ): wage inequality that would have been 
experienced for each educational category if education was not chosen, but 
randomly assigned. It is the sum of the transitory volatility as defined above (
2
st  ) 
and the permanent component (
2
s  ). The permanent component here accounts for 
selection and truncation biases (Panels C and D in table 4b). 
  Unobserved heterogeneity ( si   ): includes all the characteristics known to the 
individuals, but unknown to the econometrician that influence the schooling 
decisions and bias the OLS wage estimates (Panels H and I of Table 4c). 
  Wage uncertainty (
2
s  ): proper measure of risk in educational category s,  equal to 
the sum of transitory component as defined above and a permanent component 
(estimates in Panel G table 4c) accounting for the unobserved schooling factor  i  .  
Estimates of wage uncertainty (risk) can be found in Panel H and I in table 4c.  
   9
III. Data 
 
Chen’s estimates are based on the NLSY: 1979-2000 merged with restricted geocode 
data. The geocode gives access to detailed information on the residence of respondents; it 
allows to control for the population density in the county of residence and to construct an 
instrument: average tuition fees in the county of residence for a public four-year college in the 
year when the respondent was 17. We do not have access to the geocode data since their use is 
limited to researchers at American institutions. We will have to use a different instrument for 
schooling and we will not be able to control for population density in the area of residence. 
However, this should have no consequences as long as our instrument serves the same 
purpose as Chen’s instrument. At worst we will experience some loss of efficiency.  
Both our and Chen’s original sample consist of 12,686 respondents aged 14-22 in 
1979. Chen focuses only on males between survey years 1991-2000, which corresponds to 
calendar years 1990-1999, so that all the respondents should have already terminated their 
studies. Sampling weights are used to calculate all estimates. Since she does not specify 
which sampling weights were used, we will apply the standard sampling weights
7 provided 
with the NLSY79. She excludes respondents that do not provide any information about 
parental education or the particular ability index that she utilizes. Following her line of 
conduct 4930 individuals remain in our sample
8. We also have to drop 11 individuals who do 
not have any information on highest grade completed. An additional 228 observations were 
deleted since it was impossible to retrieve the exact work experience accumulated over the 
period in consideration. Finally, for as many as 1318 individuals no information on the hourly 
rate of pay is available. Since this is one of the outcome variables, we had to erase them from 
our sample. Thus, at this point, our balanced panel sample constitutes of 3373 individuals.  
Chen (2008) is not explicit about the exact size of her sample. Her time invariant 
variables, selected with the above mentioned procedure, have 4302 respondents, 628 
individuals less than what we obtained. She also has an unbalanced sample for time variant 
regressors. For the first year she has 2826 observations. The size constantly diminishes with 
time, until only 2522 individuals remain in the 1999 sample
9. It is not clear to us how she 
obtained those numbers since all the variables she claims to select her sample on are time 
invariant and the original NLSY79 database has no attrition. She does not provide any 
                                                 
7 The sampling weights used are coded as R3655800, R4006300, R4417400, R5080400, R5165700, R6466300, 
R7006200 in the NLSY79 for the survey years 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000 respectively. 
8 6283 females, 452 individuals with no information about ability index, 414 individuals with no information 
about mothers’ and 607 about fathers’ education were deleted.  
9 Chen (2008) p.280 table 1.    10
information about sample size used in her first stage regressions. Her wage regressions are 
based on 3184 respondents and 18245 observations. Thus, apparently, 1118 individuals 
included in Chen’s descriptive statistics that we will present in table 1a have no information 
about wages.  
We follow Chen’s data choices as much as we can. Schooling is defined by the highest 
grade completed according to the 1990 survey when all respondent were at least 25 years old, 
and measured with four dummy variables: no high school (YOS<12); high school (YOS=12); 
some college (12<YOS<16); college (YOS≥16). The ability index is the Armed Force 
Qualifying Test (AFQT). It was conducted in 1980 for all respondents of all ages and 
schooling levels; original scores are regressed on age dummies and quarter of birth and 
residuals are included in the choice and wage regressions. Quarters of birth capture schooling 
effects through compulsory schooling laws (Angrist and Krueger (1991). We use hourly 
pretax earnings, from wages, salary, commissions or tips from all jobs in the calendar year 
preceding the survey
10. The family income measure considers family income at age 17, or as 
close to 17 as possible. If family income at 17 is unavailable then the measure is taken at 16 
or 18. For nearly half of the respondents the family income measure at age 17 is unavailable
11. 
The work experience measure is constructed from the longitudinal work history in the 
NLSY79. Number of weeks worked in past calendar year are converted in number of full 
working years by dividing by 49.   
  We have to deviate from Chen because we have no access to the geocode data. Chen 
adds two geographical controls to choice and wage equations: an urban dummy at age 14 and 
the county of residence population density in 1980, but population density is not available to 
us. The instrument for schooling in the original paper is the potential college tuition cost at 
county level defined as the average tuition fees at the local public four-year college in the year 
when the respondent was 17. This measure also exploits the restricted information on the 
respondents’ county of residence that is not available to us. We instrumented schooling choice 
with the average unemployment rate differentiated by sex, age group and ethnic origin for the 
years spent in school after the mandatory schooling age. The intuition behind this instrument 
                                                 
10 Chen (2008) p. 279 claims to use annual earnings. This claim does not correspond with the earnings 
measure presented in table 1 which is the logarithm of hourly earnings in 1992 dollars. We tried both outcome 
variables and chose the latter. In fact, if annual earnings were used as dependent variable in the between-
individuals model, the magnitude of the residuals as presented in table 4 panel I would seem to be too small. 
This is not the case if hourly earnings are the explained variable used.  
 
11 As is evident from table 2a and 2b, it seems that Chen included four dummies to characterize the entire 
quartile distribution of family income at age 17. Since it is evident that four dummies plus the constant would 
create a dummy trap, we suspect that, even if she does not expressly state it in her paper, she created a dummy 
variable for non response to the family income question. This is the way we proceed.   11
is that the facility to find a job in the market might influence the outside option of each 
student. A possible concern using this variable is that unemployment rates during youth might 
correlate with current unemployment rates and thus wages. We will therefore also include the 
unemployment rate for the year in which the wage is measured in the wage regressions. The 
assumption is then that conditional on current unemployment rates in the country, past 
unemployment rates are uncorrelated with wages earned
12. The lack of precise geographical 
location forces us to use the national rate of unemployment for young workers. Data about 
unemployment rates are taken from the Current Population Survey (CPS)
13. 
The risk of taking such a crude measure of unemployment as the national rate is a weak 
correlation between the instrument and schooling choices. We will show in the choice 
equations presented in table 2a and 2b that this concern is misplaced. 195 individuals dropped 
out of school before the legal mandatory age. Unemployment figures from the CPS are only 
available for people aged 16 and older. If a respondent dropped out of school before that age 
no unemployment rate is imputable. Our final sample thus counts 3,178 respondents and 
21,573 observations.   
In table 1a and 1b we report summary statistics. Our sample differs from the original 
one
14 in some aspects. First, it shows a higher number of individuals without a high school 
education, which reflects in a lower number of high school graduates and college (or more) 
graduates. Second, the average AFQT score is lower. Last, the share of ethnic minorities, 
blacks and Hispanics, is considerably higher in our sample. Also, family income is 
considerably lower. In table 1b we can see how our work experience measure is almost 
constantly one year higher, while the log of hourly earnings is slightly lower. The difference 
in hourly earnings might be explained by the larger share of high school drop outs and high 
school graduates that our sample has.  
Overall, our sample appears to represent a less educated, more ethnically diversified 
and poorer share of the population than the one Chen uses for her analysis. This is an 
unintended difference for which there is no clear explanation. It can influence the results of 
our estimations as we will see later on. 
 
                                                 
12 Arkes (2010) and Hausman and Taylor (1981) are two of the very few studies that use unemployment during 
schooling years as instrument for schooling.  
13 The URL address is: http://data.bls.gov:8080/PDQ/outside.jsp?survey=ln. (Accessed 15/06/2010) 
14 Chen (2008) p. 280.   12
Table 1a. Mean and standard deviation time invariant variables NLSY79 
  Our sample   Chen's sample 
(a)Schooling variables   
 Years of schooling  12.99  13.44 
 (2.57)  (2.50) 
Categorical education   
 No high school  .20  .10 
 (.40)  (.30) 
 High school  .36  .43 
 (.48)  (.50) 
 Some college  .21  .21 
 (.41)  (.41) 
 Four-year college or beyond  .22  .26 
 (.41)  (.44) 
(b) Ability and family background   
 Armed forces qualifying test score (adjusted)  43.30  62.35 
 (29.21)  (28.50) 
 Highest grade mother  11.10  11.85 
 (3.20)  (2.61) 
 Highest grade father  11.12  12.01 
 (3.93)  (3.53) 
 Number of siblings  3.63  3.16 
 (2.52)  (2.17) 
 Family income  23,320*  50,321* 
 (16,941)  (34,544) 
 Black  .25  .11 
 (.42)  (.31) 
 Hispanic  .14  .05 
 (.35)  (.22) 
(c)Geographic controls at age 14    
 Urban  .79  .77 
 (.41)  (.42) 
 Northeast  .19  .21 
 (.39)  (.41) 
 South  .33  .29 
 (.47)  (.45) 
 West  .19  .15 
 (.39)  (.36) 
(d) Instrument for schooling    
Average unemployment during schooling years  25.33   
 (5.62)   
*1999 dollars. Average unemployment rates calculated on CPS data. 
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Table 1b. Mean and standard deviation time variant variables NLSY79 
Our Sample 
    Calendar  year 
Labor  market  variables  1990 1993 1995  1997  1999 
Actual  work  experience 10.03 12.77 14.40  16.09  17.93 
    (3,58) (4.05) (4.35)  (4.68)  (5.04) 
Log  Hourly  earnings  2.18 2.16 2.28  2.26  2.21 
    (.98)  (1.06)  (1.06) (1.14) (1.25) 
Unemployment  rate  5.81 8.70 6.01  5.59  4.12 
    (2.13) (2.51) (1.74)  (1.87)  (1.05) 
Chen’s sample 
    Calendar  year 
Labor  market  variables  1990 1993 1995  1997  1999 
Actual  work  experience  9.03  11.47  13.25 15.01 16.74 
    (3.37) (3.87) (4.11)  (4.34)  (4.67) 
Log  Hourly  earnings*  2.42 2.47 2.51  2.59  2.70 
    (.68) (.69) (.70)  (.84)  (.85) 




We will present our results in three steps: first stage estimates to instrument schooling 
levels, GLS and IV wage equations, and decomposition of variances of observed wages, 
potential wages and uncertainty. In each of these tables, columns in bold report the results of 
our estimates, while the normal print reproduces Chen’s original results. We have 
scrupulously tested our estimation routine through a Monte-Carlo simulation (results available 
on request). Our routine was able to retrieve all the parameters of the simulated dataset with 
good precision. Therefore, we exclude that discrepancies reported below are the result of a 
misunderstanding of the estimation procedure.  
 
A. First Stage: using national unemployment rates as instrument  
Table 2 reports the results of the ordered probit taking schooling level as the explained 
variable. Given that we have to use a different instrument, it is important to point to the 
significant effect that our instrument has for every level of education even after controlling for 
ability, family background, racial and geographical origin and age. Overall our fit is similar to 
Chen’s. All covariates show the same sign and roughly the same magnitude. The only 
appreciable difference between the two estimations is the magnitude of the two sets of cutoff 
points. Our cutoff points are negative and the intervals are wider. It’s perhaps remarkable that 
the effect of the unemployment rate is negative. One usually reasons that the opportunity cost 
of schooling falls when unemployment is high. But of course the benefits from extended 
schooling may fall even more during a recession, thus making the investment less profitable.          14 
Table 2. First stage estimates ordered probit and marginal effects. 
  Coefficients  Marginal effect at means 
    Less than high school  High school  Some college  4 year college or beyond 
Covariates  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
Tuition cost in county/1,000    -.055***    .010***    .012***    -007**    -.015** 
    (.012)    (.002)    (.003)    (.002)    (.003) 
Average unemployment rate during 
schooling years  -.063***    .009***    .016***    -.009***    -.016***   
  (.005)    (.001)    (.001)    (.001)    (.001)   
Interact unemp. Rate with/                     
     Mother attended college  .071***   -.010***    -.018***    .010***    .018***   
  (.009)   (.001)   (.002)    (.001)    (.002)   
     Father attended college  .055***    -.008***    -.014***    .007***    .014***   
  (.008)    (.001)    (.002)    (.001)    (.002)   
Highest grade mother   .040***  .033**  -.006***  -.006**  -.010***  - .007*  .005***  .004*  .010***  .009** 
  (.005)  (.011)  (.001)  (.002)  (.001)  (.003)  (.001)  (.002)  (.001)  (.003) 
Highest grade father   .048***  .029**  -.007***  -.005*  -.012***  -.006**  .007***  .004***  .013***  .008*** 
  (.004)  (.009)  (.001)  (.002)  (.001)  (.002)  (.001)  (.001)  (.001)  (.002) 
Family income bottom quartile  .010  -.199  .002  .039  .003  .038  -.002  -.029  -.003  -.049 
  (.035)  (.154)  (.005)  (.033)  (.009)  (.025)  (.005)  (.024)  (.009)  (.34) 
Family income second quartile  -.058  -.005  .009*  .001  .016*  .001  -.009*  -.001  -.016*  -.001 
  (.031)  (.153)  (.005)  (.027)  (.008)  (.033)  (.005)  (.020)  (.008)  (.040) 
Family income third quartile  .014  .061  -.004  -.010  -.007  -.014  .004  .009  .007  .016 
  (.028)  (.15)  (.004)  (.025)  (.007)  (.035)  (.004)  (.018)  (.007)  (.041) 
Family income top quartile  .238***  .164  -.033***  -.027  -.065***  -.038  .031***  .020  .067***  .045 
  (.028)  (.151)  (.004)  (.023)  (.008)  (.037)  (.003)  (.016)  (.008)  (.044) 
AFQT score (adjusted)  .028***  .024***  -.004***  -.004***  -.007***  -.005***  .004***  .003***  .007***  .006*** 
  (.000)  (.001)  (.000)  (.0002)  (.000)  (.0003)  (.000)  (.0002)  (.000)  (.0003) 
Black  .713***  .653***  -.069***  -.082***  -.206***  -.173***  .045***  .047***  .230***  .208*** 
  (.026)  (.056)  (.002)  (.006)  (.008)  (.017)  (.002)  (.004)  (.009)  (.020) 
Hispanic  .587***  .435***  -.057***  -.059***  -.171***  -.113***  .039***  .038***  .189***  .134*** 
  (.037)  (.070)  (.003)  (.008)  (.011)  (.020)  (.002)  (.004)  (.013)  (.024) 
Geographic controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Cohort and age controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Constant(K0)  -11.955***  .711*                
  (.254)  (.315)               
Cut point (K1)  -9.793***  2.148***               
  (.241)  (0.316)               
Cut point(K2)  -8.352***  2.905***               
  (.229)  (.317)               
Wald chi-squared  9,064.92  1,148.6                 15
B. Causal effects of schooling on average wages 
The estimates of the causal effects of schooling on wages are presented in table 3. 
Our GLS estimation shows the expected positive effect of education, experience and 
ability on wages. In our case, returns to education increase while in Chen’s case both 
high school graduates and college graduates have higher benefits from schooling after 
instrumenting.  In our case, Hispanics also appear to earn more after instrumenting. In 
stark contrast to Chen’s results, we find no significant effect of the selectivity 
correction terms. The different effects of the four inverse Mill’s ratios will have a 
strong impact on the calculations of the correlation coefficient  s   and, in turn, on the 
estimate of potential wage inequality
2
s  .   16
Table 3. Wage equations: estimates of GLS and Heckman selection model 
 
Between-individual 
model(GLS)  Heckman 
Covariates  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
High school graduates  .085***  .088**  .036  .371** 
  (.012)  (.030)  (.039)  (.148) 
Some college  .132***  .242***  .106*  .242*** 
  (.014)  (.081)  (.045)  (.081) 
Four-year college or beyond  .397***  .241***  .428***  .599*** 
  (.016)  (.028)  (.057)  (.116) 
Experience   .130***  .076***  .184***  .074*** 
  (.005)  (.014)  (.011)  (.014) 
Experience2   -.001***  -.001  -.004***  -.001 
  (.000)  (.001)  (.000)  (.001) 
AFQT score (adjusted)  .005***  .004***  .004***  .0005 
  (.000)  (.000)  (.001)  (.002) 
Mother’s years of schooling  -.003  .008*  -.003  -.005 
  (.002)  (.004)  (.004)  (.005) 
Father’s years of schooling  -.000  .003  .003  -.004 
  (.001)  (.003)  (.003)  (.004) 
Family income bottom quartile  .005**  -.005  .027  .015 
  (.002)  (.056)  (.035)  (.057) 
Family income second quartile  .001  .037  -.024  .025 
  (.015)  (.055)  (.032)  (.055) 
Family income third quartile  -.030*  .059  .018  .038 
  (.013)  (.054)  (.030)  (.055) 
Family income top quartile  -.002  .093  .085**  .053 
  (.012)  (.054)  (.030)  (.057) 
Number of siblings  .005**  -.0004  .000  .003 
  (.002)  (.004)  (.004)  (.004) 
Black  .064***  -.053**  .331**  -.158*** 
  (.013)  (.026)  (.128)  (.053) 
Hispanic  .039*  .020  .255**  -.062 
  (.015)  (.029)  (.087)  (.045) 
Unemployment rate  -.001    -.072**   
  (.002)    (.026)   
Constant  .329***  1.118***  .892***  1.077*** 
  (.046)  (.103)  (.172)  (.117) 
Geographic controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Cohort and age controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Selectivity adjustments         
No High school      .028  -.303** 
      (.025)  (.113) 
High school graduates      -.042  -.182** 
      (.028)  (.089) 
Some college      -.030  -.099 
      (.022)  (.079) 
Four-year college or more      -.066  -.324*** 
      (.047)  (.106) 
R-squared  .404  .311  .450  .320 
Note: Columns (1) and (3) are our estimates, columns (2) and (4) are from Chen (2008) and also control for local population 
density. Our geographic controls include the urban dummy and three regional dummies for residence at 14. Cohort controls 
include a full set of birth cohort dummies and age in the initial survey year. */**/*** indicate confidence levels of 10/5/1 percent 
respectively. Standard errors in parentheses.   17
 
C. Main results 
In table 4a panel A we report observed wage inequality and its two 
components. The first is the permanent component, identified by the mean squared 
residuals in the between-individuals model
15   (equation 10). The second is the 
transitory component 
2
st    identified by exploiting the mean-squared errors of the 




st   is consistently estimated by
17: 
21 1 ˆ ˆ ˆ /( 2) /( ( 2)) st st i i si i i ii VN T T N TT 
       ,                               (15) 
where  ˆ
st V   is the mean squared errors of the fixed-effects model and 
ˆ ˆ /( 1 1/ ) ss t i VT    .  
    Our estimates of the permanent component are larger than Chen’s but the 
ranking is the same and even the differences between schooling levels are very close. 
Our estimates of the transitory component are smaller than Chen’s; our profile across 
levels of schooling is fairly flat, whereas in Chen’s case, there is a substantial dip after 
high school drop-outs and stability thereafter. The results for total observed inequality 
also differ. In Chen’s results, the group with some college stands out with low 
variance, while in our results, college graduates stand out with the highest variance. 
Remarkably, in both estimates the oldest age group has the highest transitory variance.  
                                                 
15 Chen affirms on page 283 that the permanent component is defined as the variance in the individual 
fixed effect model. This would conflict with the definition given on page 278 and with equation 12. For 
this reason, we will adhere to the definition provided on page 278 and use the mean squared errors of 
the between-individuals model.  
16 In a footnote to table 4 Chen (2008 p. 284) affirms that:  “The estimates of transitory volatility are 
derived by regressing squared residuals on age dummies and categorical education variables”. This 
seems to contrast with the specification of the transitory volatility parameter 
2
st   provided in note 9 
p.278 that we adopted for our estimates. We have estimated the transitory parameter also with this 
alternative specification and results are very similar. Estimates available on request.   
17 As mentioned in footnote 2, Chen does not add a time subscript to the parameter 
2
s  and when she 
presents the parameter estimate, she does not make it dependent on time either but only reports 
differences by age group (possibly for brevity of exposition). While we do have separate estimates of 
this parameter for each year, we will follow Chen’s methodology and distinguish only within age 
groups.  Measurement of the transitory component is not clear. The note to Chen’s table 4 states that: 
“the estimates of transitory volatility are derived by regressing squared residuals on age dummies and 
categorical education variables.” (Chen, 2008 p. 284). This procedure seems to contrast with the one 
highlighted in note 9 p.278. The squared residuals mentioned in Chen’s note are most likely those 
obtained from the fixed-effect model. Since we could not understand whether the outcome variable she 
regresses the categorical education and age dummies on is the variance of residuals of the fixed effect 
model or 
2 ˆst   we have applied both methods. The differences are negligible.    18
This results contradicts past results (Chen, 2008) that pointed towards a decrease in 
wage variance with age.   
As shown in Panel A, for every educational category, we systematically obtain 
a larger permanent component than Chen. The difference varies between 32% for high 
school drop outs and 25% for college dropouts. Remember that the permanent 
component here is defined simply as the mean squared residuals of the GLS model 
presented in table 3b columns 1 and 2. This means that our residual should be larger 
than Chen’s. This is contradicted by our R-squared which is substantially higher than 
the one in Chen (2008).  
 
Table 4a. Estimates of variance of observed wage inequality. 
 
Less than high 
school 
High school  Some college  College 
graduates 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
A. Permanent component  .322  .218  .306  .214  .357  .267  .420  .292 
  (.019)  (0.26)  (.016)  (0.14)  (.023)  (0.28)  (.026)  (.022) 
B. (
2 ˆst  )-Transitory component   .149   .293  .131  .197  .142  .233  .206  .221 
Age 25-30  -.056  .242  -.051  .143  -.043  .177  -.104  .166 
Age 31-36  -.054  .320  -.054  .221  -.046  .254  -.109  .244 
Age 37-42  -.024  .331  -.023  .232  -.020  .266  -.055  .255 
                 
Observed inequality (A+B)  .471  .511  .437  .411  .499  .500  .626  .513 
                 
C. (
2
s  )-Permanent component 
-Adjusted for selection and truncation 
biases 
.223  .284  .223  .242  .256  .274  .312  .356 
E. Transitory component (same as B)                 
Potential wage inequality (C+E)  .372  .577  .354  .439  .398  .507  .518  .577 
                 
F. Correlation coefficient  .058  -.568  -.092  -.371  -.062  -.190  -.124  -.534 
G. Permanent component (C-C*F2) 
-Accounted for unobserved  
Schooling Factor 
.222  .192 
 
.222  .209  .255  .264  .307  .251 
I. Transitory component (same as B)                 
Degree of wage uncertainty (G+I)  .371  .293  .353  .197  .397  .233  .513  .221 
 -Unobserved heterogeneity(C+E-
G-I) 
.001  .092  .001  .033  .001  .010  .005  .105 
Note: Columns (1), (3), (5) and (7) are our estimates, columns (2), (4), (6) and (8) are taken from 
Chen (2008). 
 
In Table 4b we present estimates of potential wage inequality, the sum of the 
permanent component after taking out the effects of selection and truncation and the 
transitory component (
2
s   +
2
st  ). Chen has analytically shown how observed wage 
inequality systematically understates potential inequality if education were randomly   19
assigned (Chen, 2008, p 278). She corrects this by incorporating a truncation 
adjustment term and a heterogeneity term (equation (11) above). Comparing row A in 
table 4a with row C in table 4b, shows that the prediction is not confirmed in our data: 
potential inequality is smaller than observed inequality. The result would suggest that 
pupils select themselves into the wrong educational category or that their schooling 
factor does not influence their choice. Since these results are quite surprising we 
conducted some robustness checks with Monte-Carlo simulation. We tried different 
instruments such as number of siblings and being raised in a Jewish family, but both 
elaborations led to the same surprising result.  
The result is theoretically impossible if normality in the error terms is assumed, 
but there are no restrictions in Chen’s estimation method impeding it. The permanent 
component 
2
s   is defined in equation (14). The first term of the sum is the observed 
wage inequality presented in row A and it enters also in the calculation of the 
potential wage inequality in row C. The difference between the two rows is due to the 
two remaining terms in (14). The only restriction on these two terms regards the 
truncation adjustment ( si  ): it should range between 0 and 1. This restriction is 
respected in our estimation. If the second term of the addition (
2
ss  





 ), potential wage inequality is higher than observed wage 
inequality. In our case the third term dominates the second and thus the unexpected 
result emerges. The low value of the second term is related to the low value of the 
correlation coefficient, as reported in Table 4c: the correlation coefficient determines 
the magnitude of the correction for selectivity, and in our case, this correction is very 
small. Conceivably, the result is due to inability of our instrument to create an 
adequate correction to the biased GLS estimator. But our instrument is surely relevant, 
as shown in the first stages reported. Since we have a just identified model, we cannot 
test its validity with a Sargan test, but we have no reason to believe that the country 
unemployment rate in youth years would have any effect on this group of 
respondent’s wages once we control for current unemployment rates. Furthermore, 
our instrument performs well in the IV estimation presented in table 3.    
Our results and Chen’s both point to a permanent component in potential wage 
inequality that is more or less stable across the lowest three education levels and then 
jumps for college graduates. But the outcomes differ for total potential inequality: in   20
our case it is markedly higher for college graduates than for the other education levels, 
whereas in Chen’s case the pattern is U-shaped and inequality for college graduates is 
not higher than for high school drop-outs.  
The key result of the analysis is the breakdown of observed wage inequality 
into uncertainty (pure risk) and heterogeneity (table 4c).  We find dramatically lower 
correlation between the unobserved schooling factor and the unobserved permanent 
component in wages. By consequence, accounting for unobserved schooling factors, 
as done in row H, has minimal effect on the estimated magnitude of the permanent 
component of wage inequality. Only for college graduates we see a minor reduction 
of about 5%. Chen’s core conclusion survives: unobserved heterogeneity is negligible; 
wage inequality is completely dominated by uncertainty. But in our estimates, 
uncertainty is clearly highest for college graduates, while in Chen’s estimates it is 
highest for high school graduates.    
 
D. Conclusion on the replication 
We have been unable to replicate Chen (2008) exactly. Data availability 
regulations prevented us from using the same instrument. Chen’s instrument for 
schooling, local tuition cost, may be particularly relevant for students from poor 
families and with relatively low ability. Number of siblings, our instrument in the 
British and German case, may have similar relevance. Our instrument for the US data, 
the national unemployment rate, has a negative effect on the inclination to continue 
into higher education. This is compatible with standard human capital theory if 
benefits from extended education decline more than the cost of education with rising 
unemployment, a case that may well hold for low ability students from poor families. 
Chen’s description of her procedures was not always unequivocal. Following the 
instructions in Chen’s original paper did not bring us to the same sample of 
individuals. In our sample, we have a larger share of lower educated individuals, from 
poorer family backgrounds. This may lead to difference in estimated coefficients.  If 
less advantaged people are more prone to lose their job we would observe a higher 
transitory volatility. In reality what we observe is a lower transitory volatility in our 
replication. Less advantaged individuals might also posses less private information or 
they might not be able to use it correctly and that would reflect in higher share of pure 
risk and possibly in higher observed than potential permanent variance. In effect that   21
is what we observe in our elaboration. The sensitivity of our results to modest changes 
in sample composition is reason for concern. We do feel confident though, that our 
estimation procedure faithfully reflects Chen’s model. 
In our estimates, the transitory component in observed wage inequality is about 
1/2 to 1/3 of the permanent component, while in Chen’s estimates they are about 
equal.  Chen finds that potential wage inequality is larger than observed inequality, 
while we find the reverse (at a larger gap). In our case, observed wage inequality is 
virtually identical to uncertainty, leaving no room for unobserved heterogeneity, and 
this conclusion is similar to what Chen finds (her heterogeneity is marginally bigger).  
We find that uncertainty is close to 40% higher for college graduates than for high 
school drop-outs, while Chen finds that high school drop-outs have some 30 % higher 
uncertainty than college graduates.      
 
V. Applying the analysis to American women   
 
We extend the analysis to women in the NLSY sample, but to avoid 
complications due to labor market participation behavior, we restrict the analysis to 
full time female workers only. We define full time workers as those women who 
worked at least 25 hours per week in each survey year. Applying the same selection 
criteria adopted in the previous section we obtain a sample with 2535 observations. 
The full time working women are more educated, by almost one year, than the male 
sample. They are also more able as measured by the AFQT adjusted test score. This is 
not surprising given the particular condition we imposed. It is indeed probable that 
highly educated women are more likely to participate in the labor market (Connelly, 
1992) and thus be included in our analysis. As for the time variant variables, full time 
working women show a better performance in the labor market. They have a 
substantially higher working experience and earn more than their male counterparts.  
The first stage estimates are not shown here. No appreciable difference 
emerges between the previous first stages based on men only and these new ones. The 
instrument is still relevant and has the same impact on further education. The cut-off 
points are modified. The interval between the three points is slightly larger than 
before.   22
Also, the between-individuals model, instrumental variable estimation and 
Heckman second stage do not present appreciable differences between the female and 
male samples. Full time working females belonging to ethnical minorities earn more 
than their white counterparts. This is probably reflecting that ethnic minority females 
that decide or succeed to work full time are particularly talented or dedicated. The 
other covariates do not show significant differences with the estimates presented 
earlier for men only.  
 
Table 6a. Estimates of variance of observed wage inequality – Full time females 
workers. 
 
Less than high 
school  High school  Some college  College 
 F  M  F  M  F  M  F  M 
A. Permanent component  .074 .322  .115  .306  . 118 .357 .190 .420 
 (.007)  (.019)  (.005)  (.016)  (.007)  (.023)  (.009)  (.026) 
B. Transitory component (
2 ˆst  )  .009 .149  .026  .131  .033  .142  .032  .206 
Age 25-30  .007  -.056  -.004  -.051  -.005  -.043  .003  -.104 
Age 31-36  .005  -.054  -.004  -.054  -.010  -.046  -.002  -.109 
Age 37-42  .001 -.024  -.001  -.023  -.003  -.020  -.003  -.055 
Observed inequality (A+B’)  .083 .471  .141  .437  .151  .499  .222  .626 
                
C. (
2
s  )-Permanent component 
-Adjusted for selection and truncation 
biases 
.062 .223  .093  .223  .092  .256  .159  .312 
E. Transitory component (same as B)             
Potential wage inequality (C+E)  .071  .372  .119  .354  .125  .398  .191  .518 
                
F. Correlation coefficient  .204 .058  -.061  -.092  .023  -.062  .076  -.124 
G. Permanent component (C-C*F2) 
-Accounted for unobs. Schooling  
Factor 
.059 .222  .093  .222  .092  .255  .158  .307 
I. Transitory component (same as B)                
Degree of wage uncertainty (G+I)  .024 .371  .119  .353  .125  .397  .190  .513 
 -Unobserved heterogeneity(C+E-
G-I) 
.003 .001  .000  .001  .000  .001  .001  .005 
 
As the results in table 6 show, essentially all inequality measures are smaller 
for women than for men, in most cases quite substantially so. The women that we now 
included are working full time over the entire period of analysis and therefore, by 
construction, the variability of their wages must be lower than those of males who are 
allowed to experience unemployment spells – with the consequent sudden fall of 
income – and still be part of the sample. This is also reflected in the very low values 
of transitory volatility. As for men, potential wage inequality is lower than observed   23
wage inequality. Both observed and potential wage inequality are increasing with 
education level, just as for men. The correlation coefficients shown in table 6c are 
bigger than before, but still much smaller than those calculated by Chen and 
truncation and selection adjustment have minimal impact on permanent components. 
The most affected category is college drop out whose permanent component has a 
28% decrease.  
Potential wage inequality is completely dominated by uncertainty, even stronger than 
for men; unobserved heterogeneity is virtually absent. Uncertainty, just as for men in 
our estimates, is increasing in level of education.    
 
VI. Estimation on British data 
 
The British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) is an annually collected survey that 
begun in 1991. Every year a representative sample of 5,500 households, containing 
approximately 10,000 individuals, is interviewed. If a member of the original sample 
splits-off from his original family, he is followed in the new household and all adults 
members of the new family are interviewed as well. Also new members joining a 
selected family are added to the sample and children are interviewed once they reach 
age 16. Further extensions to Welsh, Scottish and Northern Irish families increased 
the sample size to 10,000 households across the UK. We could access the surveys 
until 2008; therefore 18 waves are included in our analysis. 
As the required unemployment data are not available to us, we used number of 
siblings in the family as instrument for schooling. An additional brother/sister will 
limit the share of family income dedicated to a particular child’s education.  Families 
might decide to pay only for the education of those children who show a better 
inclination for studies. Then, number of siblings will be negatively correlated with 
schooling years and probability to access higher educational levels. We reconstruct 
the number of siblings for those young individuals who were still living with their 
parents in the first year of the survey. Our sample is limited to those individuals that 
were classified as sons in the first wave (we focused on men for the usual reason). Our 
sample is, for this reason, reduced to 16,359 individuals. From the original sample, 
7,795 females were deleted. Additionally, we had to drop 1,674 individuals that have   24
no information on income and 12,223 observations lacking information on work 
experience. Our final sample counts 21,403 time-individuals combinations.      
The BHPS does not provide any measure comparable to the AFQT score collected in 
the NLSY nor any other proxy plausibly related to ability. An additional difference 
between BHPS and NLSY is how earnings are recorded: monthly instead of hourly 
earnings. This will change the scale of transitory and permanent components that will 
be presented later on.   
 
A.  British educational system  
Compulsory education in the UK lasts for 11 years, from age five until age sixteen. 
It is divided in four key stages. The first two years (age five to seven) compose the 
first stage; the following four years (from seven to ten) the second and along with the 
first stage it constitutes primary education. The third (3 years from eleven to thirteen) 
and fourth (2 years from fourteen to fifteen) key stages form, altogether, the 
secondary education. At the end of secondary education the GSCE (General 
Certificate for Secondary Education) is awarded in specific subjects. Often, a good 
score in the GSCE is a requirement for access to further education.  
A-levels (Advanced Level of General Education) are the first degree of non-
compulsory education and are a prerequisite for access to academic courses in UK 
institutions. They take two years for completion, from age 16 to age 17.  
University education is divided in two cycles. The first awards a Bachelor degree 
and generally lasts three years, while the second leads to a Master degree and takes in 
most cases one year. Along with the standard tertiary education, a number of other 
professional higher educations such as the Post Graduate Certificate in Education 
(PGCE) or the Bachelor of Education (BEd) or nursing degrees exist.     
 
B. Wage variance in British data 
In table 7 we only present a summary of the results
18. Education is divided in 
six categories: no qualification, vocational secondary education, high school 
education, A-level qualification, vocational tertiary education and college education 
or above. Secondary vocational education is a residual category where we placed all 
respondents who declared to have accomplished secondary education, but have not 
                                                 
18 Descriptive statistics along with estimates of first-stage and wage regressions are available from the 
authors.    25
been awarded a GSCE. The group is heterogeneous and includes workers in different 
sectors. In the tertiary vocational education group we include individuals with PGCE, 
BEd and nursing degrees. The other four groups are of easy interpretation. 
Observed variance is smaller than potential inequality in 3 out of 6 educational 
categories and larger in the other 3.  The transitory component of inequality is small 
relative to the permanent component. Correlations differ strongly between education 
categories and are certainly not low, except for those without any educational 
qualification. Uncertainty is mostly substantially larger than heterogeneity, except for 
vocational high school graduates. Observed and potential inequality generally decline 
with increasing levels of education and so does uncertainty; vocational high school 
stands out as an exceptional category, with large (negative) correlation, low inequality 
and high uncertainty.  
 












Observed wage inequality             
A. Permanent component  3.395  .563  2.206  1.905  1.612  1.029 
          
B. Transitory component  .245  .024  .164  .159  .148  .197 
 Age 18-25  .014  .121  .020  .055  -.033  .017 
 Age 26-35  .011  -.004  -.001  -.002  -.034  -.049 
 Age 36-45  .038  .122  -.007  .007  -.057  -.068 
 Age 46-55  .023  .056  .014  -.005  -.047  -.072 
 Age 56-65  .047  .113  .023  -.004  -.057  -.067 
          
Observed inequality (A+B)  3.640  .587  2.370  2.064  1.760  1.226 
          
Potential wage inequality             
C. (
2
s  )-Permanent component  3.204 1.250  2.105  1.984  1.779 .990 
          
Potential wage inequality (C+B)  3.449  1.274  2.269  2.143  1.927  1.187 
          
Wage  uncertainty          
D. Correlation coefficient  .047  -.798  -.144  .386  .424  .412 
            
E. Permanent component (C-C*D2) 
-Accounted for unobserved 
schooling factor 
3.197 .454  2.061  1.689  1.459  .822 
          
Degree of wage uncertainty (E+B)  3.658  .478  2.225  1.848  1.607  1.019 
          
 -Unobserved heterogeneity (C-E)  .007 .796  .044  .295  .320  .168 
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The vocational high school group is truly exceptional: observed inequality is 
about 1/6 of that of the unqualified group. The relatively low variance among 
vocational high school graduates is caused both by the permanent and transitory 
component of observed wage inequality. In fact, both parameters are the lowest 
among the six categories. It is also the category with the highest unobserved 
heterogeneity.  
Accounting for unobserved schooling factor via the introduction of the sibling 
instrument (panel E) has a noticeable impact for four out of six categories. That is 
particularly true for vocational high school graduates for whom the 36% of the 
truncation adjustment is due to the inclusion of our instrument. 
 
VII. Estimation on German data 
  
For Germany we used data on males in the Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), 1984- 
2008. There is no proxy for ability and we cannot control for parental family income. 
Schooling is instrumented by number of siblings. We find a striking difference 
between observed and potential wage inequality: observed inequality is only a tenth of 
the potential for every educational level. This is due to a correlation coefficient 
between wages and the unobserved schooling factor slightly over or slightly under 1. 
Technically, it is the result of some huge negative inverse Mill’s ratios obtained in the 
Heckman two-step procedure. The disproportionate correlation coefficient causes 
other meaningless results such as a negative permanent component accounted for 
unobserved schooling factor in panel E or and negative wage uncertainty. For these 




  Variation in observed wages at given levels of education has often been taken 
as an indication of the risk associated with investing in education (Bonin et al 2007; 
Diaz Serrano, 2007; Hartog, 2011). Yet, at least conceptually, part of the variation 
will result from heterogeneity among students and may be foreseen by the potential 
student when deciding on schooling. In a survey paper of several contributions by 
Heckman and co-authors, Cunha and Heckman (2007, p.892) conclude: “For a variety 
of market environments and assumptions about preferences, a robust empirical   27
regularity is that over 50% of the ex post variance in the returns to schooling are 
foreseeable at the time students make their college choices”. Heckman and his 
associates use elaborate models based on the assumption that if information that only 
becomes available after schooling has been completed has an impact on schooling 
choices, it must have been known by the student when deciding on schooling. Their 
estimation combines different datasets and uses observations on test scores. Chen 
(2008) distinguishes observed and potential inequality and decomposes potential wage 
inequality into uncertainty and unobservable heterogeneity, by allowing for self-
selection and truncation biases along more traditional Heckman lines. . 
We take six main conclusions from Chen’s original paper. First, potential 
wage inequality is larger than observed wage inequality. Second, the transitory 
component in observed inequality is about equal to permanent inequality. Third, 
observed and potential inequality are both more or less stable across level of 
education. Fourth, the correlations between the unobserved schooling factor and the 
permanent individual effect in wages are negative and not negligible Fifth, the most 
essential conclusion for our present purpose: unobserved heterogeneity is negligible 
compared to uncertainty as it only accounts for 1.1% of potential wage variability for 
college graduates and 0.3% for the other three groups. Sixth, uncertainty is highest for 
high school drop-outs and about constant for the other three schooling levels.  
In our replication on the same dataset we are unable to confirm these results. 
We find that potential inequality is smaller, instead of larger that observed inequality. 
The transitory component in observed inequality is not equal to the permanent 
component but only 1/3 to 1/2 of it. Observed and potential inequalities are only 
constant for high school graduates and beyond: high school drop-outs have higher 
values. The correlation coefficients we obtain are also negative but very small. We 
only agree firmly on the fifth conclusion: uncertainty strongly dominates unobserved 
heterogeneity. However, it is not highest for the lowest level of education but for the 
highest. 
The deviations between original and replication are very substantial for an 
attempt at pure replication. However, our attempt was frustrated by several barriers. 
First, when following Chen’s instructions we were unable to arrive at the same sample: 
ours had a larger share of lower educated individuals and came from poorer socio-
economic background. Second, because of restrictions on data accessibility to non-
Americans we were unable to use the same instrument for schooling as Chen did. To   28
what extent these problems are responsible for the deviations we cannot assess. We 
can only note that our instrument performed quite well. We have shown our 
instrument to be relevant and even though we could not test for its validity, we have 
no theoretical reason to doubt it. We have also been very careful in checking the 
correctness of our estimation routine by running Monte Carlo simulations; our 
program passed this test with flying colors.  
We have performed, in Hamermesh’s terms, three scientific replications: on 
women in the same data source as the original paper and on data for the UK and for 
Germany. The result for US women are closer to our results for men than to Chen‘s 
results. Potential inequality is again smaller than observed inequality, the transitory 
component is very small and much smaller than the permanent component, observed 
and potential inequality are increasing in education, the correlation coefficients are 
small (except for high school drop-outs), one of them is negative while the other three 
are positive and as for men in our estimates, uncertainty dominates over negligible 
heterogeneity and is increasing in education.  
For the UK we find that potential inequality is greater than observed inequality 
in half the cases and smaller in the other half, both are declining in level of education, 
the transitory component is only a fraction of the permanent component, the 
correlation coefficient is not negligible, twice it is negative and in four cases it is 
positive, uncertainty dominates over heterogeneity with one exception and is 
declining in education.    
In the German case, we found correlation coefficients close to or even larger than 1. 
This leads to results we find unacceptable and we conclude that the Chen model 
simply does not apply to our German data.   
If we take the results at face value, we can only conclude that the results differ 
substantially among countries. This suggests that different schooling systems and 
different labour markets have very different effects on the components of inequality 
and in particular on the relationship between uncertainty and schooling level. We 
cannot conclude that a college education is universally a safer investment than a 
secondary education: in our estimates for the US, both for men and for women, 
planning a college education carries more uncertainty than planning a high school 
education, while in the UK, the uncertainty of a college education is lower than the 
uncertainty of A levels. It would be interesting to investigate which institutional 
factors drive these results, but that exceeds the purpose of the present project.    29
The question is of course whether we can take the results at face value. Our 
replication of Chen’s results shows, at the very least, that different instruments for 
education give rise to very different results. This does not build confidence in the 
robustness or general validity of the outcomes. The results for Germany, with 
correlation coefficients above 1, even raise more doubts. So we end with the usual 
certainty: more work is needed. While indeed Chen’s model represented a significant 
step forward towards distinguishing heterogeneity and risk, we think that it’s validity 
can be extended by allowing for non-parametric estimation. This, indeed, will be our 
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